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A Large-Scale
Experiment with Climate –
The Extreme Winter of 1939/40 and Climate Research –
Dr. Arnd Bernaerts
2008
THE ISSUE: Europe suddenly experienced its
coldest winter in more than 100 years. Since the 19th
century, winters had become successively milder. “The present
century has been marked by such a widespread tendency towards mild
winters that the ‘old-fashioned winters’, of which one had
heard so much, seemed to have gone for ever. The sudden arrival at the
end of 1939 of what was to be the beginning of a series of cold winters
was therefore all the more surprising,” reported the
British scientist A. J. Drummond in the QJoR Met. Society as early as
1943. But neither he nor climate researchers in general went searching
for the cause. This article explores the possible reasons.
A. Why Ist
the War Winter 1939/40 Interesting?
From the time the Second World War began on 1 September, the
weather displayed a broad range of peculiarities on both the local and
large scale. Only four months into the war, Northern Europe was back in
a small ice age. A look at meteorological developments through the end
of February 1940 reveals a direct or indirect relationship to the high
level of naval warfare activities in the North and Baltic Seas. But the
thesis of the effects of the naval war is only one side of the coin.
The other side of the coin is much more decisive and, in view of the
ongoing climate discussion, can be called dramatic, even
irresponsible.
The climate makes an abrupt about-face in the winter of 1939/40, and
climate researchers show no interest – neither immediately after
the war nor half a century later. The IPCC has been talking about
climate change for 20 years now, yet still does not have a clue about
events in the autumn and winter of 1939/40 and whether this was the
start of global cooling lasting more than 30 years. This is not a
question of just any historical study, but of recognising how climate
functions, how it can suddenly change and what the underlying causes of
such changes can be. In particular, did human activity play a small or
even a major role in the occurrence of the most severe winter in a
period of more than 100 years?
The naval
war in the autumn and winter of 1939/40 was a gigantic field study with
verifiable effects. Researchers should have realised this and drawn
conclusions relevant for the current climate discussion long
ago.
B. Why Are Six Months of a Single Winter So Important?
What had happened? In the summer of 1939, everyone was
talking about war, and shortly afterwards the Second World War began
indeed. Poland was razed to the ground within three weeks. Three
million soldiers immediately moved into position on both sides of the
Rhine, and a number of war navies “were unleashed onto the
oceans.” (Fig. 1) Thousands of ships criss-crossed the North Sea
and Baltic day and night, ordered to fight, to monitor, to train.
Huge areas of water were agitated, and consequences were quickly felt.
Before the year had come to an end, the weather was beginning to
display the extremes that would lead to record winter conditions in
January and February 1940. Could anyone have foreseen this? Should the
politicians have been warned? The possibility was certainly there, if
sufficient consideration is given to the influence of the seas on
weather and climate. But meteorology had not reached such an advanced
stage at the time, and meteorologists did nothing to prevent cruising
and fighting warships from conducting a gigantic “field
study”. Even today, the extreme winter of 1939/40 remains largely
neglected, although this winter in particular would be an outstanding
object of study to explore the effects of human activities. Simply
change the condition of the oceans, and weather and climate promptly
begin to undergo long-term changes.
The time
for the start of the “field study” was well chosen for two
reasons:
FIRST:
The winter half of the year is especially suitable for an experiment
with the climate because of the significantly reduced influence of the
sun in the region from Central Europe to the North Pole. North of the 50th
Parallel (English Channel, Frankfurt, Prague), the major climate factor
of the sun plays a substantially weaker role for a number of months.
The North Sea and the Baltic have stored a maximum quantity of heat at
the end of August, beginning of September. (Fig. 2) They
release this heat into the atmosphere during the autumn and winter.
Northern Europe benefits enormously from this. In addition to the
influence of the Gulf Stream off the western coasts of England and
Norway, this heat released by the North Sea and the Baltic is a major
reason why Northern Europe has such a mild winter climate, provided
that these seas do not freeze over. Suddenly, an unusual component is
introduced into this system, one which acts like a spoon rapidly
stirring hot coffee.
The more the spoon stirs, the faster the coffee cools off. A calm sea
releases heat slowly. The release of heat increases proportionately as
the wind picks up and waves become higher. Travelling and fighting
warships are even more effective because they “stir” the
oceans at every moment of their deployment at sea, regardless of
whether this is during the many periods of calm, when the wind is
blowing gently or when it is at gale force. Battleships at that time
had a draught of up to 10 metres and could plough through the water at
60 km/h. It would take a really strong wind to affect the ocean to such
a depth. Any heat which these seas have lost is not replaced for many
months. The less heat the seas can release into the atmosphere, the
lower the temperatures of the air in the affected region. The main
thrust of the following remarks will be to clarify this process during
the course of the winter of 1939/40. (Section D, Cold Seas – Cold
Weather)
SECOND:
The claim, so frequently heard, that an increased concentration of
aerosols, especially sulphate aerosols, was responsible for the cooling
is fundamentally irrelevant for the winter season in the northern
hemisphere when there is little sunshine, and especially for an extreme
winter such as that of 1939/40. The climate is affected, according to
the widely held theory, when more aerosols reflect more sunlight back
into space or when more aerosols cause more clouds to form, with the
consequence that less solar energy reaches the Earth’s surface.
This may have an effect on temperatures during the summer months, but
it can have only negligible effects, if any at all, during the winter
months when there is so little sunshine. So
the possibility that the winter of 1939/40 was caused by fluctuations
in solar radiation or its reflection back into space as a consequence
of an increase in industrial aerosols can be excluded.
But
caution is advised! A dramatic increase in aerosols due to hostilities
can also result in more rain from the formation of more clouds, drawing
moisture from the atmosphere and making it drier. Dry air intensifies
the effect of high pressure just as dry land areas do. The drier the
air, the more easily cold polar air can spread out. The events in the
autumn of 1939 presumably had a significant effect on precipitation in
Central Europe, amplifying the effects of the naval war. More on
this question later. (Next section: The Great Rain)
The
striking significance of the climate story of the war winter 1939/40 is
therefore not the sun or industrial aerosols or greenhouse gases, but
rather the immediate effect which a sudden human intervention had on
the oceans, which in turn affected the weather and climate. The story
of the effects of naval warfare on the climate, which possibly extend
over a period from 1939 to about 1970, has been told in detail
elsewhere so that it is expedient to restrict the discussion here to
the first war winter 1939/40. This winter is distinct from the later
winters during the war in that human activities suddenly intervened in
the natural course of the seasons in this year, whereas in the
following years the “unnatural” intervention meant that
weather statistics no longer described the “natural” course
of events.
While on
the subject of statistics, an important note: Evidence of the premature
cooling of the North Sea and Baltic as a consequence of naval warfare
cannot be provided in the form of measurements of seawater
temperatures. The observation network which would be required for this
did not exist at that time and, indeed, does not exist even today.
Conclusions about the temperatures found in the oceans can be drawn
only from measurements of the air. In addition to the air temperatures,
the process and scope of the freezing over of the seas is important
indicator, and both of these factors reached such extreme values that
the cause cries out for a convincing explanation.
REMARK:
This researcher has taken note of the claim by S. Brönnimann et
al. (Nature 2004), that the “global climate anomaly in 1940
to 1942 constitutes a key period for our understanding of large-scale
climate variability and global El Niño
effects.” As this is not the place to add further comments as done
already elsewhere, only one
question should be raised: “What effect does an extreme Northern
Hemisphere climatic anomaly have in the South Pacific and
elsewhere?” The situation during the Second World War period
changed many "common statistical weather aspects" dramatically. As
Brünnimann et al. bases their research on the assumption that the "El Niño event started in
autumn 1939, reached full strength in January 1940 and lasted, with
varying intensity, until spring 1942,” they actually paid little attention to the possibility
that an El Niño
culminated already in summer 1939, and whether it is possible and was actually the case
that there was "one El Niño event from autumn 1939 to spring 1942"
without proving such a claim to be correct. It seems that the matter is
much more complex than Brönnimann et al. assume.
C. The Great Rain in Autumn 1939
C-1 It Is Raining Cats and Dogs
Adolf
Hitler soon found out what “Great Rain” can mean
politically. As early as the beginning of October 1939, Hitler had
given orders to develop the plan “Yellow” for an invasion
of France. But the masses of water which fell as rain on Western Europe
were enormous. There was no doubt in November that any attack would bog
down in mud. The invasion was postponed by 9 months. Had Hitler’s
war machinery on land, on sea and in the air caused this precipitation?
The situation can be described statistically like this: The war had
hardly begun when the rain started coming down in buckets in Western
Europe, from Basle to Paris, Amsterdam and London, for three long
months. (Fig. 3) To be precise: 200% more than average in
September, 300% more in October and 200% more again in November. In
some of the regions of Western, Central and Southern Germany, measured
rainfall was twice, in some cases three and a half times as much as
usual: for example, Augsburg 366%, Nördlingen 362%, Kaiserslautern
336%, Würzburg 316%.Three times the
normal amount also fell in the southeast of England in October.
Greenwich had seen this type of rainfall only in 1888 and 1840. This
was also the case for Camden Square in London, where it rained 50 hours
longer than the statistical average. In Freiburg im Breisgau, it rained
on 30 of 31 days in October, other locations near the battle-ready
Maginot/Westwall line had 24 days of rain. (Details in: Climate Change
and Naval War, 2005, Chapter 2-31 & 2-32, pages 107 –122,
also http://www.seaclimate.com/).
C-2 The
Rain Factors
Two
factors must have been involved to produce such quantities of rain and
cause them to fall on Western Europe:
1.
Massive fighting in Poland and
along the front lines on the Rhine involving thousands of artillery
pieces, aircraft, tanks and ground troops undoubtedly released enormous
quantities of aerosols which could serve as condensation nuclei for a
lot of rain.
2.
The warships cruising and
fighting on the North Sea and the Baltic would have ensured a constant
supply of atmospheric moisture.
C-3 Wind
Shifts
The key to the constant rainfall is found in the second
factor. The rising of warm air favours the formation of low-pressure
areas, and air must flow in to replace it. In 1948, M. Rodewald pointed
out an extreme anomaly of the air pressure in November 1939, when a
deviation of ‑17 mb in the sea area from the Central Norwegian coast to
southwest of the Faroe Islands appeared. Even
more astonishing is what was happening further to the east over
Scandinavia and Northern Germany, driving masses of moist air to the
Rhine. (Fig. 4)
Meteorologists at the Naval Observatory (Seewarte) in Hamburg
determined at the end of October that the wind had suddenly
“shifted” contrary to the long-term wind statistics. Where
24% of the wind, in the average of many years, had come from a
south-westerly direction, it was now only 6%, and 65% instead of the
usual 26% of the wind was suddenly coming from the north-east quadrants. A dramatic rise in the
evaporation rate of the North Sea and Baltic and the enormous
quantities of rain over the war-front along the Rhine could have been a
major cause of these wind shifts.
High air
pressure over Scandinavia prevailed in autumn, as indicated by an
example, the weather map of December 12, 1939. (Fig. 5)
The
extreme situation is also illustrated by another observation in England
in 1943. Over an observation period of 155 years (1788 – 1942),
the prevailing wind direction in winter in 134 years was from the west;
the wind came from the east-south quadrant in only 21 years, and from
the north-east quadrant only in the years 1814, 1841 and the winter of
1939/40 (Fig. 6).
Note: War was being
waged in China and Outer Mongolia as well in the autumn of 1939.
Following heavy rainfall on the East Coast of the USA in September,
large regions of the USA had almost no rain at all in October and
November.
More information in: Reference books and websites
C-4 No West Wind Drift, But Circulation
Disruptions
The
weather report of the Naval Observatory from 2 November 1939 referred
to an important weather anomaly: “The current reports have
pointed out a number of times that the west wind drift in the moderate
latitudes is very slight this year and is almost completely lacking
over Europe.” The first effect of the naval war on the North
Sea and Baltic became apparent here: higher evaporation rates and the
inflow of cold air from a north-easterly direction prevented the west
wind drift. Moreover, the atmospheric moisture usual during the autumn
in the northern hemisphere was reduced to such a degree by the
widespread war events in Europe (and in the Far East) that the
circulation was disrupted. The German meteorologist Richard Scherhag
described this phenomenon in 1951: “In complete contrast to
the situation of the severe winter 1928/29 ... the remarkable winter of
1939/40 was caused by a general disruption of circulation,”with the closing remark:
“So there is still no plausible theory to explain the large
inflow of cold air over the Arctic”
Indeed, the explanation has still not been provided even today,
although the primary cause will be found in the reduction of
atmospheric moisture in the air circulating in the northern hemisphere
caused by the war. This not only resulted in disruptions of the
circulation, but also cleared the way for very cold Arctic air masses
to push forward without difficulty into the middle latitudes of the
USA, China and Central Europe in January 1939/40. But while there was
only one cold wave in January 1940 in the USA and China (see reference
books and websites), Northern Europe was battered by a second one in
February, making the winter of 1939/40 the coldest one in more than 100
years. The reasons for this will be described in the following
section.
D. Cold
Epeiric Seas – Cold Winters
One can
approach the course of the war winter 1939/40 with two questions:
(1)
When are the deviations from a
statistical mean of such magnitude that the search for convincing
explanations becomes mandatory?
(2)
To what extent can a
relationship to naval war activities be derived from the course of the
winter, e.g., temperatures and freezing of the seas?
The
following discussion seeks to answer these questions.
D-1 The Unusual Global Circulation Disruption in Winter
1939/40
D-3 Cold
War at the Arctic Circle
The
situation was especially remarkable as early as the second half of
December in Finland, which was attacked by the Soviet Union on 30
November. The New York Times correspondent James Aldridge
reported on 25 December 1939: “The cold numbs the brain in
this Arctic hell, snow sweeps over the darkened wastes, the winds howl
and the temperature is 30 d egrees below zero (‑34.4° C). Here the Russians and Finns are battling in blinding snowstorms
for possession of ice-covered forests. … I reached the spot just
after the battle ended. It was the most horrible sight I had ever seen.
As if the men had been suddenly turned to wax, there were two or three
thousand Russians and a few Finns, all frozen in fighting attitudes.
Some were locked together, their bayonets within each other’s
bodies; some were frozen in half-standing positions; some were
crouching with their arms crooked, holding the hand grenades they were
throwing; some were lying with their rifles shouldered, their legs
apart…. (T)heir fear was registered on the frozen faces. Their
bodies were like statues of men throwing all their muscles and strength
into some work, but their faces recorded something between bewilderment
and horror.” The Hamburger Anzeiger reported on 22 December
that the temperatures in North Finland ranged between 30° and
36° below zero. The December statistics for Helsinki (Fig. 9)
are more moderate, but they also bear witness to the coming plunge in
temperatures.
D-4 The
Cold Powers In
Northern
Germany also suffered early from colder temperatures. Fig. 10
shows that the first cold phase occurred between 7 and 23 December. The
Hamburger Anzeiger reported that the Alster had frozen
over, even though the ice was very thin (20/12), called on the
city’s citizens to clear away snow and ice (22/12) and boasted:
“The Elbe will never freeze over again; ice-breakers which keep
the channel clear have been patrolling the river since 1874/75”
(23-24/12), a claim which was to prove false within only a few weeks.
The second cold wave started before the year came to an end and had a
dramatic effect all over Europe: -48° in Northern Europe, -32°
in Bulgaria and -18° in Spain (see Fig. 8).
D-5 A Real Winter for Great Britain
Even
Great Britain was affected. January 1940 was the coldest month since
1895. The southern part of the country was much more severely hit, and
it was possibly the coldest winter there in 100 years, wrote H. C.
Gunton, chronicler of the Royal Met Society, only a few months later. A report for the Kew
Observatory (near London) noted that January was the coldest month
since 1791 and had the most days below freezing. It was with some
surprise that Drummond determined in 1943:“The
present century has been marked by such a widespread tendency towards
mild winters that the ‘old-fashioned winters’, of which one
had heard so much, seemed to have gone for ever. The sudden arrival at
the end of 1939 of what was to be the beginning of a series of cold
winters was therefore all the more surprising. Never since the winters
of 1878/79, 1879/80 and 1880/81 have there been in succession three
such severe winters as those of 1939/40, 1940/41 and 1941/42.” The January data document the lowest temperatures
measured for the past 100 years in Greenwich as well.
Finally, there was the “Great Snow” of 26 – 29
January 1940 in Southern England, with cold, wind and snow drifts
measuring 3 metres and more in height.
The Neue Zürcher Zeitung reported on 29 January 1940 that
the Thames had frozen over near London for the first time since 1814.
The fact that it was the south-east of England which was especially
affected by the cold is strong evidence that the large military
presence in the southern North Sea, the English Channel and the Irish
Sea was a contributing factor.
D-6 The Second Cold Wave and Not Only Denmark Was
Shivering
While the far western part of Europe was spared a second
extreme cold wave, Central, Northern and Eastern Europe were hard hit a
second time in the middle of February (Fig. 11). It was to be
the coldest winter in 110 years for Berlin and Halle, for example (time
from November to March). It was the most severe winter for Denmark as
well since 1860, reported the New York Times (NYT) on 15
February 1940. Snowstorms had swept across Denmark before the end of
December 1939 (Frankfurter Zeitung, 29 December). Jutland
was also affected (Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 3 January 1940). In the middle of January, the temperature fell to
-26° C; in combination with heavy snowfall, this brought transport
to a standstill in many parts of the country (NYT, 18 January 1940). In
the middle of February, the temperatures fell again to ‑25° C (NYT,
14 February 1940), which may have been a result of Denmark’s
being so close to the naval war activities on the North Sea and Baltic.
The significance of being located on these waters is vividly
demonstrated by the graph for Königsberg. (Fig. 12) The
low temperatures deviated from the mean values of the long-term
statistics by about 11° in January, by about 15° in February
and by about 5° in March 1940. (See Fig. 7.)
D-7 Record Cold Between the Seas
The low
temperatures in Hamburg fell below -20° C four times within a
two-month period, dropping below -28° C on 13 and 14 February 1940,
the coldest temperatures ever recorded in Hamburg. (Fig. 13)
The Finish expert Erkki Palusuo noted: “A cold air pool in
the German area in mid January and lasting for about a week began to
move on January 24 towards the Baltic region from where, reinforced, it
pushed back to German territory on February 7. February 12 its centre
was in the region of Hamburg, from where, moving slowly, it arrived in
East Germany about February 20.”
Why did such a rare event happen in winter 1939/40, and then in
Hamburg, a city close to two seas? One must only recall that the
Germany Bight was travelled by an extremely large number of warships,
that the English flew a number of bombing attacks, that English
submarines penetrated the bay and engaged in battles and that a
gigantic carpet of sea mines numbering about 60,000 to 100,000 mines,
thousands of which exploded before the end of the year, was laid from
Holland all the way up to Skagerrak within the first three months of
the war. The same was true for the western and southern Baltic Sea
which had been the scene of tremendous activity for naval warfare,
training and monitoring since the invasion of Poland. It should
therefore come as no surprise that the largest cold zone in February
1940 stretched from Königsberg to Amsterdam and that Hamburg was,
so to speak, at the centre of this zone.
D-8 To What Extent Can A Relationship
to Naval Warfare
Activities Be Determined?
This
question really should be superfluous, because “every
child” knows that stirring a hot soup causes the steam to rise
and the soup cools off more quickly. But since climate scientists have
not yet learned about such obvious matters, an analysis of the
“field study” carried out in the North Sea and Baltic by
conducting naval warfare from September 1939 will help to make this
clear. This is possible only in abbreviated form and only with regard
to winter 1939/40. Anyone wishing to see a convincing answer to this
question must also examine the course of the next two winters in
Northern Europe 1940/41 and 1941/42 (as has been done elsewhere; see:
reference books and websites), because it was a European naval war
until the beginning of 1942; only after Pearl Harbor in December 1941
did it become a global war fought on all of the world’s oceans,
giving a completely new dimension to the effects of naval warfare
activities on the climate. For more than four years, gigantic sea
regions in the North Atlantic and the Pacific Ocean were
“ploughed up,” which must have affected long-term the
natural temperature and salt content structures of several dozen metres
of water below the surface, influencing global air temperature over a
longer period of time. (Details: Climate Change & Naval War;
p 225-247)
It is really more than surprising that no answers have
yet been found to such important questions as the lack of the west wind
drift over Europe, the rain along the Rhine, the shifting of the winds
and the two plunges in temperature, first in January and then in
February 1940. There is excellent, extensive documentation of the
meteorological autumn 1939. This autumn was the starting mark of a
climate change as determined by A. J. Drummond as early as 1943 (see
above) and was noteworthy for a large number of unusual aspects which
indicate a decisive effect of naval warfare activities in the waters of
the North Sea and Baltic, still warm from the summer.
E. Concerning the Freezing of the North Sea and Baltic
(With excerpts from “War Changes Climate –
The Naval War Effect”, pp. 82 – 89)
Reference
has already been made to the outstanding importance of these waters for
the winter climate in Northern Europe. The Baltic Sea in particular,
which is protected from the North Atlantic by a high mountain range
stretching from North Cape to Oslo, is a major factor for the moderate
winters even into the north of Finland. The temperature difference over
the winter between coastal and inland stations 100 to 200 km apart is
several degrees (see Fig. 2 above). Between August and December, the
Central Baltic Sea releases as much as about 10 degrees of the heat
which it has stored to a depth of about 30 metres, then from January to
March approximately another 4 degrees. (Fig. 14) If this
statistical process in affected by intense naval war activities, it is
possible to distinguish three phases:
·
Phase 1: The cooling process is
first accelerated, and more heat and moisture is transferred to the
atmosphere (late autumn).
·
Phase 2: Although the surface of
the sea has cooled off sufficiently for the water to begin to freeze,
cruising ships or battles “stir up” warmer water from
greater depths, preventing early freezing (turn of the year).
·
Phase 3: The upper seawater
layer has cooled to a depth of more than 10 metres and to a greater
extent than normal, leading to a very sudden and substantial freezing
of the seas.
E-1
Northern Baltic Sea
The
Baltic Sea along the coasts of Finland had not frozen over such a wide
area and to such a depth since 1883. The most intense battles ever
conducted in these waters had been going on in the Gulf of Finland (80
– 100 metres deep in part) since 30 November. They continued
until the middle of January 1940. The naval war activities were not
stopped for military reasons; naval movements came to a complete
standstill for a number of weeks in the Baltic Sea because of the very
sudden and deep freezing over of the sea, ultimately spreading over the
entire Baltic. The chronology of the process reads as described in the
following.
In the
middle of October 1939, the first lakes and rivers froze over in
Northern and Central Norrland (northernmost province in Sweden) and in
the north-west of Svealand (Central Sweden), a phenomenon which usually
did not occur until the end of the month. On 11 December 1939,
ship traffic was suspended in Kalix and Oulu (Gulf of Bothnia)
because of the freezing of the water. The ice began to grow near Hanko,
at the western outlet of the Gulf of Finland, from 27 December, and an
“ice bridge” formed between Turku and the Swedish
Åland Islands, where the water is shallower, on 6/7 January 1940,
about two and a half weeks earlier than usual.
Nevertheless,
the Gulf of Finland was still open to about 50 km east of Helsinki on
15 January 1940. The fact that the Gulf had only moderately iced over
despite the very low temperatures which had dominated since 20 December
(see Fig. 9) can be seen as a consequence of the intensity of the naval
warfare activities. The naval war theory is supported further by the
fact that the complete icing over the Gulf which followed happened
within a very short time span. “The ice formed very rapidly
on the parts of the sea still open, and on January 27, with a fairly
weak 3-4 Beaufort NE wind blowing, the northern Central Baltic even,
off Utö (ca. 100 km west of Hanko) froze,”, observed the
Finish expert E. Palosuo.
The
Swedish expert C. J. Östman
had the following remarks about ice conditions in Swedish waters
in winter 1939/40: The ice was generally thicker than is usually
the case. In the Gulf of Bothnia, it was only slightly thicker, while
the ice in the southern Baltic and on the west coast of Sweden
reached thicknesses of up to 60 centimetres, twice that of normal
winters.
E-2 Southern Baltic Sea
Ice had
already begun to appear in the southern Baltic Sea in the middle of
December. This development is not surprising when once considers
the activities of the naval forces: since Germany’s invasion of
Poland, warships and coastal artillery had been firing at each other at
many points along the Polish coast. The Germans laid a series of mine
fields south of the Danish waters, but Denmark also laid sea mines.
German, Danish and Swedish warships patrolled the southern Baltic
heavily. The German navy was training tens of thousands of future crew
members as well as developing and testing new ships and weapons in this
sea region. Once the conquest of Poland was complete, heavy supply
traffic from the west to the east began. The Bay of Greifswald
south-east of Rügen began to freeze over on 18 December and
did not start to thaw again until 4 April 1940. It was 11
April before the ice had disappeared completely. (See Fig. 16)
E-3 Kattegat
The ice
began to form in the middle of December and quickly spread into
shipping lanes. As many as 115 ice days were recorded. The last ice
floating in the sound was observed on 19 April 1940. (Fig. 15,
Sea Ice – 13 Feb. 1940) Owing to the early formation of
ice, 1940 became one of the most severe ice winters ever. Low
temperatures reached -22.2° in December, ‑24.3° in January,
-27.4° C in February and -22.0° C even in March. The monthly
temperatures in Copenhagen, even in February, do not otherwise fall
below zero as an average. Ships securing supply lines were able to pass
through the frozen channels only by travelling in convoys accompanied
by ice-breakers.
E-4 German
Bight
The first
ice-breakers were deployed on the Elbe as early as 16 December 1939.
Temperatures in Hamburg had remained almost constantly below zero since
8 December. The pack ice spread even further from 26 December and did
not melt for more than 90 days – until the middle of March 1940. (Fig.
16) The first ice in the German Bight was registered in
Tönning at the mouth of the Eider on 17 December. The freezing
over did not begin until two weeks later only at Germany’s
northernmost point, the island of Sylt. This is a clear indication of
deeper water – and of the still relatively warm water masses in
the northern North Sea. Moreover, the navy was more active in the
shallower waters south of Tönning. Helgoland was a key naval base.
In the southern region (Borkum), the ice remained 60 – 70 days
– until the end of February. 102 days were counted at the mouth
of the Elbe, 100 days in Tönning. North of this region, there were
60 days from the beginning of January until early March.
F –
Closing Comments
Even
after having existed for many decades, the science of weather and
climate did not attach the importance to the oceans which they
deserved. In 1939 at the latest, it should have become apparent to
experts that climate is a function of water. Leonardo da Vinci
(1452 – 1519) put it succinctly long ago: “Water is the
driver of nature.” Since the oceans exceed the total amount of
atmospheric moisture by a factor of 1000, there is ample justification
for defining climate as the “continuation of the seas by other
means,” because they feed
gigantic quantities of heat and water into the atmosphere (see above).
If climate had been understood in this sense at the time, it would have
been possible to mitigate the rising political turbulences in 1939 at
least to some degree by warning about the climate changes which would
occur. But the science of meteorology did not understand much at that
time and said nothing.
For more
than 20 years now, scientists have believed they are called upon to
predict apocalyptic scenarios of climate change and to demand costly
programmes and taxes from politicians. They do so without any
consideration of events which their fathers and grandfathers
experienced themselves. Those generations marched off to a world war in
1939, and only four months later there was a collapse of the climate.
The temperatures in Northern Europe fell to a level which was extreme
even for the small ice age. Such low temperatures had not been
experienced in more than 100 years. The temperatures were 5 – 10
degrees below the average of many years. Although this was not
even 69 years ago, the extreme winter of 1939/40 remains
un-investigated. The two following winters, 1940/41 and 1941/42, set a
large number of records for cold in Northern Europe as well as marking
the start of a noticeable cooling of the northern hemisphere lasting
more than three decades. In 1948, the German meteorologist M. Rodewald
described it in this way: “(It is ... shown) ... – a
“secular heat wave” made itself felt over most of the
Earth. We noticed this especially in the increasing mildness of the
winters which, while beginning in the previous century, became more and
more striking between 1900 and 1939. So it is all the more surprising
that there was a series of three severe winters in succession in
1939/40, 1940/41 and 1941/42, appearing to indicate a sudden reversal
of the previous development rather than a slow deceleration, contrary
to the sustainment tendency of circulation and temperature
deviation.” Anyone who claims to
understand climate change must also be able to explain these events.
Anyone who can explain these events will recognise that the oceans play
the key role in any and all questions of the climate.
G. Reference Books and Websites (Selected)
General
and various articles since 1992: http://www.oceanclimate.de/
H. The
author Dr. Arnd Bernaerts trained as seaman and served as ship master
before becoming a jurist, lawyer and international consultant.
[16]Drummond, A. J.; 1943;
“Cold winters at Kew Observatory, 1783-1942”; Quarterly
Journal of Royal Met. Soc., No. 69, 1943, pp. 17-32, and ibid;
Discussion of the paper: “Cold winters at Kew Observatory,
1783-1942”; Quarterly Journal of Royal Met. Soc., 1943, pp. 147
and following
[20]op.
cit.,Palosuo, Erkki;
1953.
[21] Östman, C. J.; 1940;
“Den svara isvintern 1939/40”, Statens Met-Hydro.
Anst., Meddelanden Ser. Uppsatzer, No. 33, Stockholm 1940, pp. 1-25
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